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BEYOND THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: SHOULD SCHOOLS HAVE THE
AUTHORITY TO PUNISH ONLINE STUDENT SPEECH?
BRITTANY L. KASPAR*
INTRODUCTION
On October 24th, 2006, a high school sophomore came home from
school and sat down at his home computer to instant message friends
about music, TV shows, and classes - just as he did every other after-
noon.1 This particular afternoon however, a friend began repeatedly
prodding the student about what type of guns he has access to and
which fellow students he would kill if presented the opportunity.2 The
same friend immediately thereafter emailed excerpts of the conversa-
tion to their school principal.3 Hours later, police showed up on the
student's doorstep and took him into custody.4 Despite the fact that
this student did not have any history of threatening or violent conduct,
school administrators eventually suspended him for the remainder of
the school year.s
The essence of the issue in the aforementioned facts is not the ex-
istence of true peril presented by the student's statements, nor is it the
legitimacy of the school's chosen form of discipline. Rather, focus
should be placed on the student's complete lack of certainty regarding
the permissibility of his online speech. At a bare minimum, every stu-
dent is entitled to know whether or not a statement he communicates
via the Internet while sitting in his own home will subject him to disci-
pline at his school. Because the status of the law revolving around off-
campus, online student speech is both obscure and antiquated, it is
more than likely that the student in this case - and in countless other
cases decided within the last several years - was oblivious to the fact
that he could be punished for statements made on the Internet from
the comfort of his home.
* J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2013.
1. D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 757-58 (8th Cir. 2011).
2. Id. at 758.
3. Id. at 757.
4. Id. at 759.
5. Id. at 757-59.
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Even before the advent of the Internet, both on and off-campus
student speech jurisprudence was described as "complex, somewhat
dissociative, and perhaps contradictory."6 Now, however, the World
Wide Web has "revolutionized communication, allowing people to
converse instantaneously at the click of a button."7 MySpace, Facebook,
Twitter, YouTube, and various other social networking sites employ
"'user friendly' interfaces, allow[ing] even the most casual of users to
share up-to-the-minute personal information, photographs, and vide-
os."8 Today, over 87 percent of children between the ages of twelve
and seventeen use the Internet, spending an average of twelve hours a
week online.9 This rapid rise in teen Internet use has resulted in an
"explosion of student speech cases."io Indeed, "student speech cases
are among the most commonly litigated cases under the First Amend-
ment."11
Although the Supreme Court has issued four opinions on the per-
missibility of sanctioning student speech, each one deals with either
speech occurring on-campus, or speech occurring during an off-
campus, but school-sanctioned, activity.12 Thus, the high Court has yet
to address the permissibility of punishing students for off-campus,
online speech.13 As a result, lower courts have struggled to decide
whether it is constitutional under the First Amendment for school-
teachers and administrators to discipline students for speech originat-
ing off-campus and on the Internet. On one hand, some courts side with
the students, holding that the school's authority to sanction student
speech does not extend off-campus and into the realm of the Internet.
6. Philip T.K. Daniel, Bullying and Cyberbullying in Schools: An Analysis of Student Free
Expression, Zero Tolerance Policies, and State Anti-Harassment Legislation, 268 ED. LAW. REP. 619,
626 (2011).
7. Allison E. Hayes, From Armbands to Douchebags: How Doninger v. Niehoff Shows the
Supreme Court Needs to Address Student Speech in the Cyber Age, 43 AKRON L. REv. 247, 247-48
(2010).
8. Benjamin T. Bradford, Is It Really MySpace? Our Disjointed History of Public School Disci-
pline for Student Speech Needs a New Test for an Online Era, 3 J. MARSHALL L.J. 323, 324 (2010).
9. Hayes, supra note 7, at 247-48; Travis Miller, Doninger v. Niehoff: Taking Tinker Too Far,
5 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 303, 303 (2011).
10. Emily Gold Waldman, Badmouthing Authority: Hostile Speech About School Officials and
the Limits of School Restrictions, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 591, 617 (2011). See also Lee Goldman,
Student Speech and the First Amendment: A Comprehensive Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 395, 430
(2011) ("Student speech cases dominate courts' First Amendment dockets."); Hayes, supra note 7,
at 247-48 ("This speech-enhancing medium has led to numerous controversies, causing its regu-
lation to become a flashpoint in First Amendment jurisprudence.").
11. Goldman, supra note 10, at 396.
12. Hayes, supra note 7, at 271.
13. Id. See Stephanie Klupinski, Getting Past the Schoolhouse Gate: Rethinking Student Speech
in the Digital Age, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 611, 614 (2010).
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However, a number of federal circuit courts have held in favor of
schools, finding that the punishment is constitutional regardless of
where the speech originated, as long as the speech caused a substantial
disruption to the school environment. Legal scholars generally agree
that "[b]ecause lower courts are in 'disarray' when defining school
jurisdiction over online student speech, the issue is ripe for Supreme
Court review."14
Part I of this comment discusses the First Amendment generally
and the four Supreme Court cases that have refined its application with
respect to on-campus student speech. Part II presents the ensuing cir-
cuit split over the constitutionality of disciplining students for online,
off-campus speech. Specifically, this section will explain both of the
existing perspectives and why neither of the two is ideal. Part III at-
tempts to devise a solution to the current divide by advocating a com-
promise position. In particular, an analysis of the existing case law will
demonstrate the ability of this proposal to balance longstanding First
Amendment principles with the interests of school administrators.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Since the days of the Vietnam War, the legal realm has attempted
to discern exactly how far First Amendment protections extend with
respect to student speech, basing its arguments on a telling history and
few words in the constitutional text. A general understanding of the
First Amendment will help shed light on the subsequent discussion of
the existing Supreme Court cases from the past four decades that es-
tablish the nature and extent of student free speech rights.1s Even
though the challenged speech involved in all four of the cases occurred
either at school or at a school-sponsored event, these cases provide
instructive guidance with respect to the constitutionality of disciplin-
ing students for Internet speech.16
A. The FirstAmendment
While the text of the First Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution states that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the free-
14. Joseph A. Tomain, Cyberspace is Outside the Schoolhouse Gate: Offensive, Online Student
Speech Receives First Amendment Protection, 59 DRAKE L. REv. 97, 102 (2010) (quoting Doninger v.
Niehoff, 594 F. Supp. 2d 211, 224 (D. Conn. 2009)).
15. John 0. Hayward, Anti-Cyber Bullying Statutes: Threat to Student Free Speech, 59 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 85, 102 (2011).
16. D.J.M.ex rel. D.M.v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 760 (8th Cir. 2011).
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dom of speech,"17 the Amendment does not protect every expression
without reservation.18 The Supreme Court has, for example, declined
to extend First Amendment rights to include true threats - statements
that "would communicate to a reasonable person a serious intent to
cause a present or future harm."19 This special treatment is justified on
the ground that the potential societal value of the threat is overshad-
owed by "the fear and disruption it engenders and the possibility that
[it] will be carried out."2o In addition to these wholly excluded classes
of speech, some categories of speech contain qualified restrictions un-
der certain circumstances. One of these limited classes is student
speech in public schoolS.21
With this general First Amendment overview in mind, I will now
turn to the four Supreme Court cases that explain the development of
student speech jurisprudence as we know it today.
B. The Supreme Court Precedent
In 1969, the Supreme Court established an elevated22 standard for
student speech rights, "extend[ing] them well beyond traditional
bounds."23 In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict, the Court held that suspending a group of high school students
who expressed their personal views by wearing black armbands to
school as a way of protesting the Vietnam War was unconstitutional.24
The decision "articulate[d] the two-pronged test that has since been
used in countless student speech cases."25 In order for school authori-
ties to constitutionally punish student speech, the expression must
either "substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge
upon the rights of other students."26 In Tinker, the school's "mere de-
sire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompa-
17. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
18. Kathy Luttrell Garcia, Poison Pens, Intimidating Icons, and Worrisome Websites: Off-
Campus Student Speech That Challenges Both Campus Safety and First Amendment jurisprudence,
23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 50, 53 (2011). See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 446 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("Our First Amendment jurisprudence has identified some categories of expression
that are less deserving of protection than others - fighting words, obscenity, and commercial
speech to name a few.").
19. Goldman, supra note 10, at 411-12; Hayes, supra note 7, at 249.
20. Garcia, supra note 18, at 88.
21. Morse, 551 U.S. at 411 (Thomas, J., concurring).
22. Hayes, supra note 7, at 252.
23. Morse, 551 U.S. at 416 (Thomas, j., concurring).
24. 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
25. Waldman, supra note 10, at 596.
26. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
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ny an unpopular viewpoint" was not sufficient to justify banning "a
silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder
or disturbance."27 The Court further cautioned that a mere "undifferen-
tiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome
the right to freedom of expression."28
Notwithstanding the majority's firm stance on the unconstitution-
ality of the school's action, justice Black's dissent cautioned against the
Court's holding: "If the time has come when pupils of state supported
schools ... can defy and flout orders of school officials... it is the be-
ginning of a new revolutionary era of permissiveness in this country
fostered by the judiciary."29 Perhaps partly in response to his concerns,
the Supreme Court has gradually "scaled back Tinker's standard" by
refusing to apply the substantial disruption test to some student
speech caseS.30 In particular, three subsequent cases have each estab-
lished that Tinker is not the only test that applies,31 thereby comprising
a "patchwork of exceptions" to Tinker.32
About twenty years after Tinker, Bethel School District v. Fraser
was the first of the three ensuing cases to signal "at least a partial
break with Tinker."33 In Fraser, a school suspended a student for deliv-
ering a speech before a high school assembly that contained "an elabo-
rate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor."34 Absent a manifest
analysis under Tinker's substantial disruption rule, the Court held that
disciplining the student was nonetheless constitutionally permissible
because "it was perfectly appropriate for the school to disassociate
itself to make the point to the pupils that vulgar speech and lewd con-
duct is wholly inconsistent with the 'fundamental values' of public
school education."3s The Court reasoned, "[n]othing in the Constitution
prohibits the states from insisting that certain modes of expression are
inappropriate and subject to sanctions ... The determination of what
27. Id. at 508-10. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 404.
28. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
29. Id. at 518 (Black, J., dissenting).
30. Morse, 551 U.S. 393 at 417 (Thomas, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 405.
32. Id. at 422 (Thomas, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 418 (Thomas, J., concurring). See Klupinski, supra note 13, at 618 ("Tinker is gener-
ally hailed by scholars as the high water mark of student free speech, while the subsequent Su-
preme Court decisions are viewed as chipping away at students' First Amendment protections.").
34. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 678 (1986).
35. Id. at 685-86.
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manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappro-
priate properly rests with the school board."36
Less than two years after Fraser, the Supreme Court created an-
other exception to Tinker for school-sponsored activities in Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhimeier. When staff members of a high school
newspaper sued the school for refusing to publish two of their articles,
the Court held that "educators do not offend the First Amendment by
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their ac-
tions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."37 The
Court attempted to distinguish Kuhlmeier from its precedent in stating,
"[t]he question whether the First Amendment requires a school to tol-
erate particular student speech - the question that we addressed in
Tinker - is different from the question whether the First Amendment
requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student
speech."38
In the Supreme Court's most recent student speech decision,
Morse v. Frederick, school administrators punished a student for un-
furling a large banner across the street from the school bearing the
phrase "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS."39 Because of the special characteristics of
the school environment and the governmental interest in stopping
student drug abuse, the Court held that schools are allowed to restrict
student expression that may reasonably be regarded as promoting
illegal drug use.40
Morse is relevant to the issue of student Internet speech because it
was the first of the four decisions to "expand the disciplinary arm of
the school beyond the physical schoolhouse gate."41 The opinion illus-
trated that "a court must first resolve the issue of whether student
expression falls within the authority of the school before determining
whether it belongs in one of the four categories of speech that schools
may control."42 With regard to this first step, the Court responded to
the student's argument that the case fell outside of the scope of exist-
ing student speech precedent by stating that he "cannot stand in the
midst of his fellow students, during school hours, at a school-
36. Id. at 683.
37. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
38. Id. at 270-71.
39. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007).
40. Id. at 408.
41. Klupinski, supra note 13, at 625. See also Bradford, supra note 8, at 333.
42. Bradford, supra note 8, at 333.
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sanctioned activity and claim that he is not at school."43 While the
Court did admit that "[t]here is some uncertainty at the outer bounda-
ries as to when courts should apply school speech precedents," it de-
clined to resolve that uncertainty in Morse.44 As a result, the decision
left lower courts to formulate their own tests because it "did not out-
line a method for determining how speech that occurs off campus can
become school speech."45
As of today, Morse is the Supreme Court's "last word on student
free speech."46 While the legal community eagerly anticipated the
Morse decision in hopes that it "would clarify prior Supreme Court
precedent, the existing precedents' interrelationship, and the scope of
each case," the Court's holding left commentators disappointed.47 In
the end, the standard created by the Supreme Court for regulating stu-
dent speech can be characterized as follows:
Students retain free speech rights in public schools as long as their
speech does not amount to a "true threat," does not create a material
and substantial disruption of school activities, or that schools can
reasonably forecast as creating a substantial disruption, unless the
student's speech was vulgar, lewd, or undermined the school's basic
educational mission, or unless the speech is of an offensively sexual
suggestive nature, or unless the speech is school sponsored and
school officials' actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagog-
ical concerns, or unless the speech might reasonably be understood
as bearing the imprimatur of the school itself, or unless the speech
advocates illegal drug use.48
While none of the four Supreme Court cases involved speech that
was clearly off-campus, the opinions contain a few contradictory
statements on the issue.49 On one hand, some cases have indicated that
"off-campus speech receives greater protection than on-campus
speech."so In Fraser, for example, the majority recognized that the gov-
43. Morse, 551 U.S. at 401.
44. Id. See also Miller, supra note 9, at 318.
45. Bradford, supra note 8, at 333.
46. Klupinski, supra note 13, at 622.
47. Hayes, supra note 7, at 255.
48. Id.
49. Waldman, supra note 10, at 617-18.
50. Goldman, supra note 10, at 410. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 688
(1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (The Supreme Court opinions confidently state throughout that
if a student had delivered the same speech outside of the school environment, he could not have
been penalized.); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 434 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
message on Frederick's banner is not necessarily protected speech, even though it unquestiona-
bly would have been had the banner been unfurled elsewhere."); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Moun-
tain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 937 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Smith, J., concurring) ("Courts agree
that Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse apply solely to on-campus speech.").
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ernment could not censor speech that is inconsistent with a school's
basic educational mission outside of school.si In Morse, the Court reaf-
firmed this understanding: "'[h]ad Fraser delivered the same speech in
a public forum outside the school context, he would have been protect-
ed."'52
On the other hand, Tinker itself arguably indicated that its holding
was intended to encompass off-campus speech when it stated, "con-
duct by the student, in class or out of it, which... materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech."53 While a student can still be on school property
without being "in class," this statement may be "[tlhe apparent basis
for lower courts' applications of Tinker's 'substantial disruption' stand-
ard to off-campus speech."54
In addition to this lack of clarity regarding the reach of the Court's
holdings, the Court "left entirely open the question of what constitutes
'speech outside of school' - a question made much more complicated
by the rise of the Internet, which undermines the notion of a physical
on-campus/off-campus division."5s As the concurrence in one of the
subsequent circuit court decisions noted, "[flor better or worse, wire-
less Internet access, smart phones, tablet computers, social networking
services like Facebook, and stream-of-consciousness communications
via Twitter give an omnipresence to speech."56 Because Internet use
among teens in the U.S. today is nearly universal as a means of social
interaction, "[t]he line between 'on-campus' and 'off-campus' speech is
not as clear as it once was."57
As a result of this uncertainty regarding both the scope of the Su-
preme Court precedent and the distinction between on and off-campus
speech, "[a]pplication of [the] four Supreme Court cases by lower
courts has been inconsistent, particularly with regard to Internet
51. Morse, 551 U.S. at 404. See Waldman, supra note 10, at 618 ("The Hazelwood Court thus
left unclear whether it was specifically limiting schools' authority over students' off-campus
speech, or simply contrasting school authority over student speech to government authority over
adult speech.").
52. Morse, 551 U.S. at 406.
53. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (emphasis added).
54. Goldman, supra note 10, at 410.
55. Waldman, supra note 10, at 618.
56. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011)
(en banc) (Jordan, J., concurring).




speech."58 Nonetheless, Tinker and its progeny raised a precise consti-
tutional question: where does a student's speech "occur" when the
Internet is used as a medium?59 If the answer is "off-campus," does a
school nevertheless have the authority to discipline a student for that
speech?
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
As a result of this lack of guidance from the Supreme Court,6o fed-
eral circuit courts have split on the issue of how to apply the Court's
precedents to online, off-campus speech.61 The obscurity of the exist-
ing guidance allows courts to manipulate the Supreme Court prece-
dents to achieve their desired result, leaving us with "as many different
outcomes as there are jurisdictions."62 While several believe applying
Tinker's "substantial disruption" test to student Internet speech is ef-
fective, "others believe it is the 'wrong tool' for the job."63 Despite these
conflicting opinions, Tinker's substantial disruption rule has been
widely utilized by lower courts when analyzing the permissibility of
punishment for online speech.64 The courts that do apply the first
prong of Tinker generally try to find some connection between the
student speech and the school campuS.65 Generally, if the court can
find a "sufficient 'nexus' linking the speech to some disruption, or risk
of disruption," the punishment has been upheld.66 The problem, how-
ever, is that "different courts have had very different opinions about
what constitutes a true disruption."67 This section will elaborate upon
the opposing perspectives regarding the applicability of Tinker and the
struggle to define "substantial disruption." This section will then ex-
58. Klupinski, supra note 13, at 625.
59. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011).
60. Samantha M. Levin, School Districts as Weathermen: The School's Ability to Reasonably
Forecast Substantial Disruption to the School Environment From Students' Online Speech, 38
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 859, 860 (2011).
61. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 950 (en banc) (Fisher, J., dissenting) ("Our decision today causes a
split with the Second Circuit.").
62. Hayes, supra note 7, at 286-87. See Bradford, supra note 8, at 339; Daniel, supra note 6, at
627 ("Not surprisingly, lower courts have differed in their most basic interpretations of [the
Tinker] language... which has resulted in contradictory holdings.").
63. Hayes, supra note 7, at 284.
64. Bradford, supra note 8, at 333. See Hayward, supra note 15, at 111 ("Most courts con-
fronted with this issue have applied the same legal standards as on-campus speech, which is to
say, the 'substantial disruption' analysis of Tinker.").





plain why neither perspective provides the ideal approach to deter-
mining the constitutionality of disciplining students for Internet
speech.
A. Cases in Favor of the Student
Courts that hold in favor of students find that Internet speech oc-
curring off-campus does fall within constitutional protection, and thus
is not subject to special treatment under First Amendment jurispru-
dence. These courts reach this result by reasoning that schools either
have no authority over off-campus speech, or, in the alternative, that
courts have authority to regulate off-campus speech under the Tinker
substantial disruption test, but the test was not satisfied. Holdings for
the students not only honor well-established First Amendment princi-
ples, but, by maintaining Tinker's "schoolhouse gate" as the bright line
rule, limit the authority of administrators and promote student speech.
The two existing circuit court opinions holding in favor of stu-
dents were both decided by the Third Circuit. Initially, the Circuit is-
sued opposite holdings in two almost factually identical cases - one in
favor of the student and the other in favor of the school district.68 Be-
cause these conflicting outcomes resulted in sharp criticism from the
legal community, the entire fourteen-member Third Circuit sat, en
banc, to hear oral arguments for each of the opinions. Upon this re-
hearing, the panel came out in favor of the respective student in each.
In Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, the Third Circuit held
for a middle school student who was disciplined for creating a
MySpace profile of her principal.69 The profile's contents ranged from
"nonsense and juvenile humor to profanity and shameful personal at-
tacks aimed at the principal and his family."7o After the principal re-
quested that another student bring a printout of the profile to school,
the creator, J.S., received a ten-day out-of-school suspension.71
Despite its adult language and sexually explicit content, the court
determined that the speech caused no substantial disruption and could
not reasonably have led school officials to forecast substantial disrup-
68. Levin, supra note 60, at 860.
69. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 922.
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tion in the school.72 Therefore, the school district's actions violated
J.S.'s First Amendment rights.73 The court concluded by stating,
Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever allowed schools
to punish students for off-campus speech that is not school-
sponsored or at a school-sponsored event and that caused no sub-
stantial disruption at school ... [a]n opposite holding would signifi-
cantly broaden school districts' authority over student speech and
would vest school officials with dangerously overbroad censorship
discretion.74
The school district has since filed a petition with the Supreme
Court, which is currently pending review.75
In the other Third Circuit case, Layshock v. Hermitage School Dis-
trict, the court again held in favor of a student who created a fake
MySpace profile mocking his high school principal.76 The profile con-
tained a photo of the principal and a series of derogatory comments
aimed at his weight. After learning of the webpage, the principal sus-
pended the creator, Justin Layshock, for ten days, placed him in an al-
ternative education program, banned him from extracurricular
activities, and forbid him from participating in the school's graduation
ceremony.77 Despite the fact that three other students posted even
more vulgar and offensive profiles of the principal, Justin was the only
student punished.78 The court reasoned that because it would be "un-
seemly and dangerous precedent to allow the state, in the guise of
school authorities, to reach into a child's home and control his/her
actions there," the First Amendment prohibited the school from impos-
ing discipline.79
While holdings in favor of students have several well-grounded
justifications, a "student-friendly" rule is ultimately too narrow to be-
come the preferred treatment of online, off-campus speech. By essen-
tially tying the hands of school administrators, this approach both
threatens the learning environment and eliminates the deterrent effect
72. Id. at 920.
73. Id.
74. Id.at 933.
75. Lyle Denniston, No clarity on religious displays, SCOTUSblog (Oct. 31, 2011, 1:24 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/10/no-clarity-on-religious-displays/ ("The Court has not yet
considered the other two cases on regulation by school officials of off-campus student remarks:
Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools (11-461) and Blue Mountain School District v.JS. (11-502).").
76. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 2011) (en
banc).
77. Id. at 210.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 216.
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of discipline. This is especially problematic when schoolteachers and
administrators might be the best-suited parties to impose punishment
in the first place.
First, if courts do not allow the Tinker standard to govern Internet
speech, administrators may be prohibited from disciplining students
even if there is a substantial disruption or an invasion of the rights of
others. Preventing Internet speech regulation may cause "infinite prob-
lems for school administrators attempting to maintain order and teach
civility to young people."ao The Snyder dissent expressed concern over
this ramification: "I fear that our Court leaves schools defenseless to
protect teachers and school officials against such attacks and power-
less to discipline students for the consequences of their actions."81 If
the online speech, for example, specifically victimizes another student,
commentators fear that prohibiting discipline "will 'create a climate of
fear among targeted students, inhibit their ability to learn, and lead to
other anti-social behavior' by the aggressors ... The interests at stake -
school safety and an inclusive learning environment - are far too im-
portant to jeopardize."82
In addition to impacting the offender and any potential victims,
holding in favor of the students might also have a significant impact on
other observing students. First and foremost, permitting unfavorable
conduct would "demonstrate to the student body that this form of
speech is acceptable behavior."83 Neglecting to act in the face of online
speech that is nonetheless disruptive or harmful sends a "powerful
message to students about the school's resolve."84 Thus, some sanction
may be necessary in order to communicate to other students that such
conduct will not be tolerated.85
Additionally, prohibiting punishment of disruptive or harmful In-
ternet speech wholly eliminates the deterrent effect inherent in disci-
pline. When we allow an administrator to punish a student for his or
her online speech, it is not only for the sake of that particular speaker,
but also to dissuade other students from making similar statements on
80. Hayes, supra note 7, at 288.
81. J.S. ex rel Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 941 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(Fisher, J., dissenting). See also Layshock, 650 F.3d at 222 (en banc) (Jordan, J., concurring) ("I
worry that the combination of our decisions today in this case and in JS. may send an 'anything
goes' signal to students, faculties, and administrators of public schools.").
82. Daniel, supra note 6, at 635 (quoting OKLA. ST. ANN. 70 § 24-100.3 (2009)).
83. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 945 (en banc) (Fisher, J., dissenting).
84. Garcia, supra note 18, at 75.
85. Daniel, supra note 6, at 635.
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the Internet. In Tinker, Justice Black expressed concern over this early
on with respect to on-campus speech: "One does not need to be a
prophet or the son of a prophet to know that after the Court's holding
today some students... will be ready, able, and willing to defy their
teachers on practically all orders."86 Over forty years later, the Kow-
alski court echoed this same apprehension: "Experience suggests that
unpunished misbehavior can have a snowballing effect, in some cases
resulting in 'copycat' efforts by other students."87 Thus, "[a]ny failure
to restrict this type of speech or discipline its author would almost
inevitably lead to more of the same."88
A final objection to holdings favoring students is that they under-
mine the rational discretion of administrators. By preventing school
officials from imposing punishment, even in the face of disruptive or
harmful speech, we are implicitly compelling any injured parties to
pursue restitution through courts. The judicial system, however, enters
the arena of school discipline with "great hesitation and reluctance."89
As the dissent in Morse warned: "[N]o one wishes to substitute courts
for school boards, or to turn the judge's chambers into the principal's
office."9o Not only are school administrators physically present at the
heart of the activity, they are "trained and paid to determine what form
of punishment best addresses a particular student's transgression."91
Because "[s]tudents will test the limits of acceptable behavior in myri-
ad ways better known to schoolteachers than to judges,"92 schools are
in a "far better position than is a black-robed judge to decide what to
do with a disobedient child at school."93 In his concurrence in
Layshock, Judge Jordan agreed, stating, "[t]o the extent it appears we
have undercut the reasoned discretion of administrators to exercise
86. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 525 (1969) (Black, J., dissent-
ing).
87. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011) ("[H]ad the school not
intervened, the potential for continuing and more serious harassment of Shay N. as well as other
students was real."). See also Snyder, 650 F.3d at 945 (en banc) (Fisher, J., dissenting).
88. Garcia, supra note 18, at 78.
89. Daniel, supra note 6, at 635. See also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273
(1988) ("[T]he education of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers,
and state and local officials, and not of federal judges.").
90. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393,428 (2007).
91. Daniel, supra note 6, at 635.
92. Morse, 551 U.S. at 428 (Breyer, J., concurring).
93. Daniel, supra note 6, at 635 ("They can best determine, for instance, whether a suspen-
sion or an after-school detention will be more effective in correcting a student's behavior.").
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control over the school environment, we will not have served those
affected by the quality of public education, which is to say everyone."94
The authority and logical discretion of administrators is particu-
larly essential when the online speech creates a harmful or threatening
situation that requires immediate on-campus action. When a school,
for example, needs to "act quickly and suspend a student on an emer-
gency basis to prevent potential harm while an investigation is under-
taken," resorting to the prolonged processes of the judicial system
would be entirely futile.95 Rather than instilling a fear of judicial liabil-
ity in every school administrator, these critics argue that they should
be granted wide discretion in disciplining off-campus, Internet
speech.96
B. Cases in Favor of the School
To the contrary, "school-friendly" courts hold that regardless of
whether online speech occurs on or off-campus, it is still subject to the
First Amendment rules laid out by the Supreme Court precedent. The
majority of these cases hold in favor of school administrators by apply-
ing Tinker and finding that a substantial disruption existed. Even
though the existence of a substantial disruption in some of these cases
is dubious at times,97 holding for the school effectively grants adminis-
trators the requisite flexibility to punish certain online expressions,
thereby maintaining a stable learning environment while effectively
conveying the school's stance regarding the permissible extent of
online speech.
In Wisniewski v. Board of Education of the Weedsport Central
School District, the Second Circuit held in favor of a school that disci-
plined eighth grader Aaron Wisniewski after he shared an instant mes-
sage icon suggesting that his English teacher be killed.98 The icon was a
small drawing of a pistol firing a bullet at a person's head, accompa-
nied by dots representing spattered blood and the message, "Kill Mr.
VanderMolen."99 When school administrators learned of the icon -
94. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 222 (3d Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (Jordan, J., concurring).
95. Garcia, supra note 18, at 71.
96. Daniel, supra note 6, at 635.
97. Hayward, supra note 15, at 108.
98. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Ctr. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34,35 (2d Cir. 2007).
99. Id. at 36.
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which was viewable by fifteen members of Aaron's "buddy list" over
the course of three weeks - they suspended him for a semester.100
In its holding, the Second Circuit applied Tinker's standard in con-
cluding that Aaron's speech "crosse[d] the boundary of protected
speech and constitute[d] student conduct that pose[d] a reasonably
foreseeable risk that the icon would come to the attention of school
authorities and that it would 'materially and substantially disrupt the
work and discipline of the school."'iol The court further stated: "The
fact that Aaron's creation and transmission of the [instant message]
icon occurred away from school property does not necessarily insulate
him from school discipline."102
One year later, in Doninger v. Niehoff, the Second Circuit again held
in favor of administrators who disciplined a high school junior, Avery
Doninger, for a "vulgar and misleading" blog post about the supposed
cancellation of an upcoming school event.1o3 Upset over the repetitive
delays of an event she was planning as a member of the school's Stu-
dent Council, Avery's message referred to the administrators as
"douchebags" and encouraged readers to contact one of the defendants
to "piss her off more."104 Several students added comments to the blog,
including one which referred to the same defendant as a "dirty
whore."los
In its reasoning, the Second Circuit acknowledged that "[t]he Su-
preme Court has yet to speak on the scope of a school's authority to
regulate expression that... does not occur on school grounds."106 Nev-
ertheless, the Second Circuit held that a student may be disciplined for
off-campus conduct if it was foreseeable that the expression would
reach campus and "create a risk of substantial disruption within the
school environment."107 Because the court deemed these requirements
satisfied, punishing Avery by refusing to allow her to take office as
Senior Class Secretary was permissible.108 Although Doninger ap-
100. Id.
101. Id. at 38-39.
102. Id. at 39.
103. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 43-45 (2d Cir. 2008).
104. Id.
105. Id
106. Id. at 48-49 ("If Avery had distributed her electronic posting as a handbill on school
grounds, this case would fall squarely within the Supreme Court's precedents.").
107. Id
108. Id. at 43-45.
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pealed the issue to the Supreme Court, the Court recently denied re-
view.109
In 2011, the Fourth Circuit followed Doninger's lead with its deci-
sion in Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools. When high school senior
Kara Kowalski created a MySpace posting largely dedicated to ridicul-
ing another student, the court upheld the school's punishment.11o The
heading of the page was allegedly an acronym for "Students Against
Shay's Herpes," referring to a fellow student, Shay N., who was the
main topic of discussion on the site.111 When Shay's parents notified
the school, the administrators imposed a five-day out-of-school sus-
pension and a 90-day social suspension, thereby forbidding Kowalski
from attending school events.112
The court reasoned that while Kowalski "pushed her computer's
keys in her home," she knew the fallout from her conduct would be felt
beyond, so the "reasonably foreseeable substantial disruption" test
was satisfied.113 Following a discussion of the phenomenon of student
harassment and bullying, the court concluded that, "where such speech
has a sufficient nexus with the school, the Constitution is not written to
hinder school administrators' good faith efforts to address the prob-
lem."114 While the court proposed that "[t]here is surely a limit to the
scope of a high school's interest in the order, safety, and well-being of
its students when the speech at issue originates outside the school-
house gate,"lis it declined to specifically address that issue on Kow-
alski's facts. Kowalksi has since filed a petition with the Supreme Court,
which is currently pending review alongside Snyder.116
Finally, in D.J.M. v. Hannibal Public School District, the most recent
online, off-campus student speech decision, the Eighth Circuit held in
favor of a school who suspended tenth grade student, D.J.M., after he
109. Denniston, supra note 75 ("[T]he Court denied review of the first case seeking to test
whether public school officials have the authority to discipline students for offensive remarks that
they make in Internet postings, written on the students' computers while they were at home. The
issue has been raised in three petitions before the Court this Term. The Court refused to hear the
first - Doninger v. Niehoff et al. (docket 11-113).").
110. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011).
111. Id.
112. Id.at569.
113. Id. at 573 ("[H]ad Kowalski created the 'S.A.S.H.' group during school hours, using a
school-provided computer and Internet connection, this case would be more clear-cut.").
114. Id.at 577.
115. Id.at573.
116. Denniston, supra note 75 ("The Court has not yet considered the other two cases on
regulation by school officials of off-campus student remarks: Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools
(11-461) and Blue Mountain School District v.1.S. (11-502).").
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sent instant messages from his home computer to a classmate about
shooting other students at the school.117 After discussing his frustra-
tion at having been recently spurned by a romantic interest, D.J.M.
stated that he would let her live but would shoot "everyone else" with
his friend's "357 magnum."e18 He then went on to name specific stu-
dents he would "have to get rid of," including some individual mem-
bers of groups he did not like.119 At several points in the conversation,
both students expressed amusement at the prospect of shooting par-
ticular individuals by saying things like, "haha" and "lol."12o After the
other student emailed excerpts of the conversation to the school's
principal, D.J.M. was suspended for the rest of the school year.121
In it's reasoning, the court applied two alternative rationales in
deciding that D.J.M.'s online speech was not protected.122 The first ap-
proach centered on D.J.M.'s statements as "true threats," defined as
"statement[s] that a reasonable recipient would have interpreted as a
serious expression of an intent to harm or cause injury to another."123
Because of the school's obligation to ensure the safety of its students,
combined with its concern created by shooting deaths at other schools,
the court reasoned that the school did not violate the First Amendment
in disciplining D.J.M.124 In addition to the "true threat" analysis, the
court's second approach applied Tinker, holding that "it was reasona-
bly foreseeable that D.J.M.'s threats about shooting specific students in
school would be brought to the attention of school authorities and cre-
ate a risk of substantial disruption."125
While holdings favoring schools avoid the aforementioned conse-
quences of student-friendly holdings by extending Tinker and its prog-
eny to student Internet speech, this approach is also not optimal
because it is too broad.126 As the dissent in Kuhlmeier cautioned:
"'[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substan-
tial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fun-
117. D.I.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60,647 F.3d 754, 756-57 (8th Cir. 2011).
118. Id. at 758 (internal quotation marks omitted).
119. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
120. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. Id. at 759.
122. Id. at 761.
123. Id. at 762 (quoting Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 624 (8th Cir.
2002) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
124. Id.at764.
125. Id at 766.
126. Goldman, supra note 10, at 408 ("The problem with the 'substantial disruption' test as
applied to off-campus speech ... is that it covers too much.").
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damental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved."127 Not only does holding for schools further encroach upon
time-honored First Amendment principles, but by eliminating the
"schoolhouse gate" as the bright line rule, it grants extensive authority
to school officials and chills student speech.
To begin, allowing discipline only further encroaches on the liber-
ties the First Amendment was designed to protect by extending the
muzzle on free speech beyond the schoolhouse gate. Our longstanding
First Amendment jurisprudence teaches us that, absent strong ra-
tionale, this invasion should be avoided rather than endorsed. Decades
ago, Justice Brennan's dissent in Kuhimeter cautioned that, "the Court
today 'teaches youth to discount important principles of our govern-
ment as mere platitudes."'128 Instead, he warned, we should be demon-
strating that "our Constitution is a living reality, not a parchment
preserved under glass."129 In spite of his criticism, "[d]octrinal analysis
and a close reading of recent student speech cases... demonstrate the
erosion of sound precedent through the continued expansion of a
school's disciplinary jurisdiction over online speech."13o This recent
"expanded assertion of school jurisdiction beyond the schoolhouse
gate undermines core First Amendment rights and values by restrict-
ing students' speech rights."131 Because "our schools ought to inculcate
respect and appreciation for free speech and diverse opinions, the bed-
rocks of freedom in a democratic society," we should refrain from
"clamping down on student expression."132 As a result of these long-
standing goals, some commentators argue that, absent direction for the
Supreme Court, "lower courts and schools should step lightly in using
existing Supreme Court precedent to discipline students."133
In general, cases holding for schools stress that utilizing the
"schoolhouse gate" as the bright line rule is fruitless when the speech
occurs online. The majority in Doninger, for example, quoted precedent
127. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhimeier, 484 U.S. 260, 289 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 291 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
637 (1943)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
129. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., Bexar Cty., Tex., 462
F.2d 960, 972 (5th Cir. 1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
130. Tomain, supra note 14, at 99. See also Hayward, supra note 15, at 109-10 ("[Siome legal
analysts have justifiably been concerned that off-campus student speech has come under increas-
ing attack so that free speech rights are endangered.").
131. Tomain, supra note 14, at 99.
132. Hayward, supra note 15, at 124.
133. Miller, supra note 9, at 331 ("Because the Supreme Court has not defined the scope of a
school's authority to discipline a student's online and off-campus speech, lower courts and
schools should step lightly in using existing Supreme Court precedent to discipline students.").
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stating that "'territoriality is not necessarily a useful concept in deter-
mining the limit of school administrators' authority ... when students
both on and off campus routinely participate in school affairs ... via
blog postings, instant messaging, and other forms of electronic com-
munication."'134 Despite the truth of this assertion, there are evident
problems inherent in applying Tinker to Internet cases. Doing so would
likely "open the floodgates" for school administrators to discipline
speech, regardless of time and place, as long as it substantially disrupts
the school environment or invades the rights of others.13s For some,
the mere thought of a school policing within a student's home is "more
than a little troubling."136 This is not to mention that school officials
may not be realistically capable of enforcing all student expressions
regardless of where they commence. "Trying to resolve all cases of hurt
feelings, whether generated on or off campus, would open up a Pando-
ra's box of problems for school administrators."137
Granting extensive authority to administrators necessarily re-
serves less authority for the parents of the offending children, invading
their right to raise their children as they wish.138 The Supreme Court
has expressed that parental rights are fundamental under the Four-
teenth Amendment and "should not be interfered with absent special
circumstances."139 Because "[p]arents know their children better than
anyone and have the greatest ability and interest in teaching appropri-
ate behavior... parents should be able to determine which interest
should prevail when their child is under their supervision."140 Thus,
punishment for off-campus speech should arguably be left to a stu-
dent's parent.141 In the end, a "school-friendly" rule would essentially
allow administrators to act as "roving inspectors of decency, encroach-
ing on familial and individual prerogatives."142
The final and inevitable ramification of eliminating the school-
house gate as the bright line rule is that it will chill student speech.
Without the establishment of a clear rule, a student who is uncertain
134. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48-49 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ.,
607 F.2d 1043, 1058 (2d Cir. 1979)).
135. Hayes, supra note 7, at 285-86.
136. Goldman, supra note 10, at 409.
137. Id.at 416.
138. Tomain, supra note 14, at 110 ("[An] extension of jurisdiction... violates parents' rights
to raise their children as they believe proper.").
139. Goldman, supro note 10, at 415-16.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Waldman, supra note 10, at 654.
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about the permissibility of his or her online speech may ultimately
choose to "remain silent for fear of violating the law."143 Thus, regard-
less of whether the speech is "political speech or merely offensive, ju-
venile humor," shielding Internet speech from discipline is essential to
avoid this chilling effect.144 These arguments apply with added force in
the Internet speech context due to the functioning of Tinker's substan-
tial disruption standard. Because the presence or absence of disruption
necessarily relies, not upon the actions of the speaker himself, but on
the reactions of others, "no student, even in the privacy of his or her
own home, can write about controversial topics of concern to them
without worrying that is may be 'disruptive'.... In effect, students will
be punished for off-campus speech based on the way people react to it
at school."14s Thus, application of the Tinker rules do not "simply 'chill'
student free speech, they plunge it into deep freeze."146
III. A COMPROMISE APPROACH
The current circuit split not only draws attention to the increasing
uncertainty regarding the constitutionality of punishing students for
online, off-campus speech, but also calls for a compromise approach
that will simultaneously promote the rights of students and the inter-
ests of school administrators. The following position attempts to
achieve this careful balance by asking (1) if the speech "invades the
rights of others" as a form of cyberbullying; and (2) if so, whether the
victim of the bullying is an adult administrator or a fellow student of
the offender. This method might not provide a perfect bright line rule
for teachers and administrators by entirely permitting or entirely pro-
hibiting discipline by the school. Nonetheless, it does provide a stable
middle ground on which both schools and courts can distinguish be-
tween punishments that are and are not constitutionally permissible.
A. Cyberbullying
Courts should first and foremost begin their analysis of permissi-
ble punishment by drawing a distinction between "cyberbullying" and
other forms of expression. Because cyberbullying is markedly different
from the political speech Tinker was aiming to protect, schools should
143. Bradford, supra note 8, at 356.
144. Tomain, supra note 14, at 106.
145. Hayward, supra note 15, at 91.
146. Id. at 92.
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not be permitted to discipline students for off-campus speech unless
the student made the communication with the intent of attacking or
threatening another person.147
The relatively recent phenomenon of cyberbullying has been de-
fined as "the use of modern communications technology to harass,
psychologically attack, or threaten another" through, for example, "the
spreading of lies or attacking someone on the basis of one's core char-
acteristics with the intent to cause psychological harm and to disrupt
one's life activities."148 Because preteens and teenagers are among the
most common offenders, the ramifications of cyberbullying are often
exhibited in the school setting, regardless of whether the expressions
originate from an off-campus computer.149 The ordinary cyberbully
"intends to communicate the message to both the target and to third
persons" and "[t]he message is intended to be harmful and to interfere
with the targeted student's functioning."iso
Cyberbullying is more severe than traditional forms of on-campus
bullying for a number of reasons. First, its content travels faster and is
more pervasive because it is communicated via the Internet. Because
electronic communication technology has developed at a light-speed
pace, it is now "possible for cyberbullies to send messages much more
quickly, and to much wider audiences."1st While traditional bullying
tactics "confined the victimization to mostly face-to-face interactions,
the Interhet now allows cyberbullies to reach their intended targets all
day, every day."152 Cyberbullying is also distinct from traditional bully-
ing because of the potential power of anonymity. Because cyberbullies
are capable of hiding their identities, the "veil of secrecy allows cyber-
bullies to communicate aggressive and hurtful comments that they
might not otherwise communicate in person."153 A final distinction
concerns the distance between the bully and the victim because it both
incentivizes the bully and desensitizes bystander.154 Cyberbullies,
147. While the definition of cyberbullying in any context is obviously somewhat flexible,
school teachers and administrators should use their reasoned discretion in determining whether
the speech at issue truly fits the cyberbullying mold, distinguishing harassing speech from politi-
cal speech.
148. Elizabeth M. Jaffe & Robert J. D'Agostino, Bullying in Public Schools: The Intersection
Between the Student's Free Speech Rights and the School's Duty to Protect, 62 MERCER L. REv. 407,
441 (2010-2011).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 443.






"operat[ing] from behind their electronic devices... rarely witness the
effect of their actions on their victims, enabling them to pitch deroga-
tory and hurtful language at their victims while simultaneously laugh-
ing off their behavior as inconsequential."155
Because of its negative impact on both the school environment
and on the victims themselves, off-campus cyberbullying should be
treated differently than other forms of expression. Cyberbullying can
first and foremost result in "a wide range of psychological harm."156
Victims may suffer "low self-esteem, anxiety, depression, or social
withdrawal," which can lead to "increased difficulty concentrating,
stress, [and] truancy."157 This may eventually inhibit the victim's learn-
ing experience, denying educational opportunities to him or her.158
Ultimately, cyberbullying can have more serious and long-term effects
on a victim, ranging from depression and negative self-concept, to the
ultimate self-sacrifice of suicide.ls
While suicide is without doubt the most extreme ramification of
cyberbullying, it is unfortunately a reality in our society. For example,
thirteen year-old Megan Meier committed suicide in 2006 because of
postings on MySpace saying she was a "bad person whom everyone
hated and the world would be better off without."16o Then again in
2010, fifteen-year old Phoebe Prince hung herself after almost three
months of routine harassment via Facebook and text messages "de-
signed to humiliate her and to make it impossible for her to remain at
school."161 These are not isolated incidents. Rather, numerous other
documented occurrences seem to indicate that suicide as a result of
cyberbullying is on the rise.162
These alarming effects of cyberbullying argue in favor of the po-
tential justification and legitimacy of discipline by schools in certain
situations. As mentioned above, courts tend to apply Tinker's substan-
tial disruption prong as a default in student speech cases, while notice-
155. Id.
156. Goldman, supra note 10, at 414.
157. Id.
158. Daniel, supra note 6, at 623.
159. Goldman, supra note 10, at 414. See Daniel, supra note 6, at 620 ("The effects of cyberbul-
lying on a victim range from a measureable downturn in educational achievement, to emotional
distress so egregious as to rise to the level of psychological or psychiatric harm, to the final choice
of suicide as a way of escaping the torment").
160. Hayward, supra note 15, at 86.
161. Thomas Wheeler, Facebook Fatalities: Students, Social Networking, and the First Amend-
ment, 31 PACE L. REv. 182, 182 (2011).
162. Id. at 183.
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ably ignoring the second prong-"speech that invades the rights of
others."163 Indeed, some legal scholars accuse the courts of paying "too
little attention to the second prong of Tinker."164 Thus, even without
the substantial disruption prong, schools may still have authority to
regulate cyberbullying if it is somehow invasive of another's rights.
While Tinker's substantial disruption test may be effective in the on-
campus context, asking whether a particular communication invades
the rights of others might be a more suitable test to apply when dis-
cussing online speech.
Applying this first proposed rule to the current circuit court cases
is illustrative. Of the expressions discussed in each, Avery Doninger's
blog post protesting the cancellation of her event is the least likely to
meet the definition of "cyberbullying" because her statements were not
likely made with the intent of attacking or threatening another person.
While Avery referred generally to the administrators as "douchebags"
and created the post to persuade others to harass them, her overriding
intent was arguably to express her dissatisfaction with the event's can-
cellation and to recruit others to protest alongside her. Regardless of
the fact that the post was "vulgar and misleading," her speech was
more akin to the "political speech" the Tinker Court was expressly aim-
ing to protect.165 If we restrict students from making such statements
"to the point where [they] cannot express frustration or disagreement
with what is happening at school even when they use their own com-
puter at home," we are only "rais[ing] the specter of limitless school
authority."166
Kowalski, on the other hand, lies at the opposite end of the cyber-
bullying spectrum with facts sharply contrasting those of Doninger.
There, the MySpace page Kowalski created "functioned as a platform
for Kowalski and her friends to direct verbal attacks toward classmate
Shay N."167 Not only did the site contain "comments accusing Shay N. of
having herpes and being a 'slut,"' but also "photographs reinforcing
those defamatory accusations by depicting a sign across her pelvic
area, which stated, 'Warning: Enter at your own risk' and labeling her
portrait as that of a 'whore."'168 In light of this sinister yet senseless
attack on a fellow student, the Fourth Circuit rightly concluded, "[t]his
163. Daniel, supra note 6, at 632.
164. Id. at 631.
165. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41,43 (2d Cir. 2008).
166. Waldman, supra note 10, at 592.
167. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 572-73 (4th Cir. 2011).
168. Id. at 573.
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is not the conduct and speech that our educational system is required
to tolerate."169
B. Victims: The Student-Administrator Distinction
Once a court decides that a school does have authority to regulate
the expression because it qualifies as cyberbullying, the court should
consider whether the victim at issue is a student or administrator. Be-
cause intentionally attacking a fellow peer is markedly different from
attacking an adult, a court should be more inclined to allow discipline if
the victim of the bullying tactics is a student.
First and foremost, adults are more mature and thus better able to
handle the effects of cyberbullying, whereas cyberbullying is especially
hazardous for children. Cyberbullying can have a "dangerous emotion-
al impact... on school-aged victims, as opposed to adult teachers or
administrators."17o Furthermore, "[t]he maturity levels of students
make them particularly susceptible to the harms from bullying"171
while "school personnel are expected to be more mature than the stu-
dents whom they teach."172 Thus, "because student victims present
unique problems and tragic consequences, they should take prece-
dence in school policy and enforcement."173
This proposed refinement, however, does not leave adult adminis-
trators without any form of recourse. "School administration and
staff... maintain the same protections against private Internet speech
that belongs to any other professional."174 As an additional justification
for the student-administrator distinction, it is clear that there is at least
some danger inherent in placing the determination of the permissibil-
ity and extent of discipline in the hands of an administrator who has
been attacked.175 In light of this innate risk, a court is likely the more
appropriate, and undoubtedly the more neutral body to determine
whether a student's online cyberbullying of a school official is protect-
ed under the First Amendment.176 "[G]iving school officials broad
169. Id.
170. Daniel, supra note 6, at 633.
171. Goldman, supra note 10, at 414-15.
172. Bradford, supra note 8, at 345.
173. Daniel, supra note 6, at 633.
174. Bradford, supra note 8, at 344.
175. Id. at 345.
176. Id. ("Courts are better suited for determining whether speech is criminal or unprotected
by the First Amendment, especially considering that if administrators are left to make their own
determination ... they are often left judging speech that is directed at them.").
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power to censor speech that personally attacks them raises particular
questions about the suppression of student dissent."177
Moreover, this proposal may be doctrinally rational based on the
Tinker Court's description of the "rights of others" prong as the "right[]
of other students to be secure and to be let alone."178 If the Tinker
Court did intend for this prong to extend only to fellow students,
"teacher victims [would] fall entirely outside the focus of that portion
of the test."179 Thus, under this rationale, "adult employees of the
school system may not have any extra rights created by the 'special
characteristics' of the school setting."180
The victims in the circuit court cases consisted of both students
and administrators. In both Snyder and Layshock, the students created
fake MySpace profiles of their respective principals. In response to the
student-created MySpace profile in Snyder, the principal told others he
was "upset and angry, and threatened the children and their families
with legal action."181 Although the principal in that case did not follow
through with the pursuit of criminal charges, a state police officer
summoned the students and their parents to the station to discuss the
profile and "let them know how serious the situation was."182 Although
the principal in Layshock also complained to the local police about
whether the profiles amounted to "harassment, defamation, or slan-
der," he likewise chose not to press charges.183 Instead, after admitting
his belief that the profiles were "degrading, demeaning, demoralizing,
and shocking," the principal proceeded to impose a punishment that
was both disproportionate and inconsistent.184 The principal chose to
suspend Justin for ten days, place him in an alternative education pro-
gram, ban him from extracurricular activities, and forbid him from
participating in the graduation ceremony - all the while wholly ne-
glecting to punish three other students who created even more vulgar
and offensive profiles than Justin's.18s The facts of Layshock unques-
tionably demonstrate the severity of placing authority in an attacked
administrator's hands at the height of his or her emotional response.
177. Waldman, supra note 10, at 592.
178. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
179. Daniel, supra note 6, at 633.
180. Bradford, supra note 8, at 344.
181. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 922 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
182. Id.
183. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 at 209 (3d Cir. 2011) (en
banc).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 210.
2012]1 211
212 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 88:1
CONCLUSION
The present circuit split on the constitutional permissibility of dis-
ciplining online, off-campus student speech requires a careful solution
that is able to balance longstanding First Amendment principles with
the interests of school administrators. The proposed compromise posi-
tion satisfies this balancing test and thus, should be considered the
preferred approach in all future cases involving online student expres-
sion.
